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Abstract 
Traditionally, skills policies in the UK have focused primarily upon boosting the 
supply of skills as a route to improved economic prosperity as well as social 
inclusion/mobility. However, some academic commentators have argued that this 
approach is insufficient and that more attention needs to be given to addressing 
problems of weak employer demand for, and utilisation of, skills. Recently, some of 
these ideas have begun to be taken up by sections of the policy community. Issues 
around skills demand and utilisation figured prominently in Scotland’s 2007 skills 
strategy, and are now beginning to inform new forms of policy experimentation. The 
UK Commission for Employment and Skills has also argued that ‘the future 
employment and skills system will need to invest as much effort on raising employer 
ambition, on stimulating demand, as it does on enhancing skills supply’. In light of 
these developments, the paper examines some of the challenges confronting skills 
policy in England under the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government, and considers the prospects for a more integrative and holistic approach 
to tackling the ‘skills problem’. It argues that the political and ideological space for 
such an approach is limited in England with skills policy likely to focus mainly upon 
skills supply, albeit with vastly diminished state funding/subsidy. 
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Introduction 
In his recent Mansion House speech, the business secretary, Vince Cable, cited 
Einstein’s famous definition of insanity as ‘doing the same thing over and over again 
and expecting different results’ (Cable 2011). He was referring to the need to break 
decisively with New Labour’s debt- fuelled growth model, which he alleged had 
culminated in a ‘near-death experience of financial collapse’ and plunged the UK 
economy into recession. Cable went on to reaffirm the commitment of both parties in 
the UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government to, what he called, 
‘liberal economic policy’ and a ‘growth strategy’ based on ‘free trade; deregulation; 
removing the barriers to investment’, along with ‘skills and cutting edge innovation.’ 
This paper argues that when it comes to skills policy, the Coalition’s strategy 
for England remains tightly bound up with a well-worn set of policies in relation to 
the economy and the labour market, and, as such, is also in danger of falling victim to 
Einstein’s maxim. Put slightly differently, skills policy in England, at least for the 
duration of the present Government, seems liable to be tied to a set of fixed policy 
positions which raises serious questions about its ability to take the economy and 
society to where the Government would seemingly wish it to be. But this is to get 
ahead of ourselves. First, we need to understand how skills policy has evolved in the 
UK, and in particular, England, over the last three decades, and what lessons have 
emerged through experience and research. 
From Skills Supply to Supply, Demand and Utilisation 
The general thrust of skills policies in the UK over the past 30 years has been to bring 
about a ‘skills revolution’, with publicly-funded improvements in the supply of skills 
seen as key to international competitiveness, productivity growth and improved living 
standards. This approach reached its acme under the last Labour government (1997-
2010), with the publication in 2006 of the Leitch Review of Skills and the adoption in 
England of ambitious qualification targets aimed at equipping the UK with a ‘world-
class’ skills base by 2020 (Leitch 2006). More recently, however, a new kind of 
thinking has begun to emerge, alongside the dominant narrative, which emphasises 
the need to pay much greater attention to the issue of employer demand for, and 
utilisation of, skills (see Buchanan et al 2010). 
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This re-framing of ‘the skills problem’ began in academia (see Finegold and 
Soskice 1988, Keep and Mayhew 1996, Keep and Mayhew 1999), but has recently 
been taken up by sections of the UK policy community. In Scotland, policy makers 
have become increasingly concerned that despite outperforming the rest of the UK in 
terms of the supply of higher- level skills, Scottish productivity continues to trail 
behind that of England. In 2007, the newly elected Scottish National Party (SNP) 
administration responded with a skills strategy that was strongly committed to 
improving skills demand and usage as well as supply (see Scottish Government 2007, 
Payne 2009).  
In addition, the UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES), 
established initially to oversee progress towards the Leitch targets, has also placed 
skills demand and utilisation firmly on the policy radar. In its first state of the nations’ 
report, Ambition 2020, the Commission indicated that the supply of high skilled 
workers in the UK is growing faster than the capacity of the economy to absorb them 
into high skilled jobs, and argued that, in its view, the ‘skills problem’ confronting the 
UK: 
…lies largely on the demand side. The relatively low level of skills in 
the UK; the limited extent of skill shortages; the potentially relatively 
low demand for skills relative to their supply taken together, imply a 
demand side weakness. The UK has too few high performance 
workplaces, too few employers producing high quality goods and 
services, too few businesses in high value added sectors. This means 
that in order to build an internationally competitive economy, the 
future employment and skills system will need to invest as much effort 
on raising employer ambition, on stimulating demand, as it does on 
enhancing skills supply. (UKCES 2009b: 10) 
It went on to add that, ‘there is little value to an organisation having a skilled 
workforce if the skills are not used well’ (UKCES 2009b: 11). This analysis points 
towards the need for a more balanced and integrative policy mix around skills, one 
which forges closer connections with other policy areas, such as economic 
development and industrial policy, innovation, and business improvement.  
The UKCES approach was strengthened by the fact that Scotland had already 
given a lead on skills utilisation. In 2008, the Scottish Government established a Skills 
Utilisation Leadership Group, specifically to oversee strategy in this area.  A range of 
policy activity is now underway, including 12 ‘action research’ projects, funded by 
the Scottish Funding Council, which are designed to test the role that universities and 
colleges might potentially play in improving skills utilisation in Scottish workplaces 
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(Payne 2011). UKCES is supporting these developments with research, and is placing 
particular emphasis upon the role of ‘high performance working’, together with 
improved leadership and management, as a potential vehicle for improving skill 
utilisation (UKCES 2009a, 2010). 
With skills policy in England now in the hands of a Con-Lib Coalition (formed 
following the May 2010 general election), how will it respond to the challenges 
identified above? Now is a good time to begin to examine the trajectory of skills 
policy under the new administration, and the connections with other key policy areas. 
The Government has published its skills strategy (DBIS 2010a), already set about 
reforming the governance arrangements for sub-national economic development in 
England (HM Government 2010a), and has recently produced a Plan for Growth (HM 
Treasury/DBIS 2011). The paper examines these developments and considers the 
prospects for a more integrative approach to skills policy in England which ‘invest[s] 
as much effort on raising employer ambition, on stimulating demand, as it does on 
enhancing skills supply’ (UKCES 2009b: 10). 
Past Imperfect – Skills Policy under New Labour 
Before turning to the Coalition’s skills strategy, it is useful to begin with a brief 
reminder of how skills policy developed in England under the (New) Labour 
government between 1997 and 2010. Like the Conservative governments of Thatcher 
and Major which preceded it, New Labour rejected public ownership, capital controls 
and an active industrial policy, proclaiming instead the virtues of a ‘flexible’ 
(deregulated) labour market and insisting (to an even greater extent than its 
predecessors) that in the modern global economy it was education and skills which 
held the key to national and corporate prosperity as well as individual social 
inclusion/mobility (see Blair 2007). Having originally set up the Leitch Review in 
2005 when Chancellor of Exchequer, Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister, readily 
embraced its central message that ‘skills is the most important lever within our control 
to create wealth and to reduce social deprivation’ (Leitch 2006: 2). The adoption of 
the Leitch targets as the centrepiece of skills policy in England chimed with Brown’s 
view that Britain was locked into ‘a global skills race’ (Brown 2007) in which 
economic supremacy would go to the country that amassed the biggest stockpile of 
certified units of human capital (see Keep 2009).  
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The role of the state then was to act as a lubricant of economic growth, 
through publicly-funded R&D and by helping individuals to improve their skills in 
cases where there was assumed to be ‘market failure.’ While the state withdrew from 
direct industrial intervention, the role of central government in determining the shape, 
direction and management of the education and training system increased enormously 
during the New Labour years (see Keep 2006, 2009, Coffield 2007). Essentially, the 
government set targets in terms of the proportion of the workforce expected to hold 
qualifications at various levels and then directed funding accordingly. These targets, 
which were arrived at without meaningful consultation, reflected the Government’s 
view of what constituted legitimate ‘training’ or ‘learning’ and what, in its mind, the 
state, employers and learners ought together to be aspiring towards. Supporting this 
was a complex infrastructure of multi- level planning mechanisms, designed to match 
skills supply and demand (from both learners and employers), together with top-down 
interventionist forms of performance management and control to ensure the 
responsiveness of colleges and other providers (see Keep et al 2006, Coffield et al 
2008, Coffield 2008). 
Borne in a period of economic growth, New Labour’s skills project was driven 
primarily by the expansion of publicly-funded initial education and training (largely 
through further and higher education), and relied heavily upon large doses of public 
subsidy (see Keep 2009). In terms of adult skills, the government funded adult 
learning entitlements framed mainly around level 2 (which it regarded as a minimum 
platform for employability in the labour market) and established the Train to Gain 
programme to provide subsidy to employers who helped staff gain recognised 
vocational qualifications, initially at level 2, and then later at level 3 (DBIS/LSC 
2009).  
New Labour’s skills strategy rested upon three fundamental assumptions. First, 
the belief that increasing the publicly-funded supply of qualified labour would, of 
itself, enable employers to shift ‘up-market’ and adopt higher value-added, higher 
productivity, higher skill production strategies, what might be termed a ‘supply-push’ 
effect (see HM Treasury/DfES  2002, Keep and Mayhew 2010). Second, that 
increasing the qualifications of low skilled individuals would allow them to move off 
welfare, enter employment and progress in the labour market, thereby contributing to 
the Government’s agenda around social inclusion/mobility/justice. Third, that public 
subsidy could be used to leverage the additional employer ‘buy- in’ and investment 
  5 
necessary to meet the state’s ambitious targets for developing a ‘world-class’ skills 
base, particularly in the case of intermediate and higher level qualifications.  
All of these assumptions were, and remain, problematic (see Keep and 
Mayhew 2010). The first because it tends to overlook what may be perfectly rational 
reasons as to why many UK employers continue to seek competitive advantage 
through low value added strategies using a predominantly low skilled, low waged 
workforce (see Finegold and Soskice 1998, Wilson and Hogarth 2003, Mason 2004, 
Keep et al 2006). The second because in an economy where 22 per cent of the 
workforce are low paid (defined as less than two thirds of median earnings) and many 
low-end jobs lack real progression opportunities (see Lloyd et al 2008), training away 
low qualified labour does not, of itself, ‘magic away’ such jobs, which insofar as they 
remain1 must be performed by someone. In addition, the qualifications usually on 
offer to low end workers (such as an NVQ level 2) tend to yield at best very poor 
wage returns (Wolf et al 2006, Dickerson and Vignoles 2007, Jenkins et al 2007), 
have limited traction in the labour market, and are seldom strong enough to provide 
the expected platform for progression and social mobility (see Keep and Mayhew 
2010, Lloyd and Mayhew 2010). The third assumption – that employers would 
commit their own hard cash to help meet the Government’s targets – has proven to be 
far easier said than done, a prime example being the Train to Gain level 3 pilots, 
which struggled to secure employer and individual ‘co-funding’ (House of Commons, 
2007). When push came to shove New Labour tended to fall back on rolling out more 
subsidy as a means of ‘squaring the circle’ between its own aspirations and what 
employers themselves have been willing to fund and deliver (see Keep 2006, Payne 
2008). In turn, employers have become increasingly ‘savvy’ at securing public monies 
to pay for training requirements they would otherwise have had to find out of their 
own pockets, as illustrated by the high levels of ‘deadweight’ associated with the 
Train to Gain programme as a whole (Abramovski et al 2005; DBIS/LSC 2009). 
Why then was a supply- led skills strategy so appealing to New Labour? One 
answer is simply to say that New Labour believed its own rhetoric, namely that under 
conditions of globalisation and the purported shift towards a ‘knowledge-driven 
economy’, skills were one of the few remaining policy levers available to government 
to address key social and economic problems (see Lloyd and Payne 2002, Keep 
                                                 
1 Research suggests that low paid jobs, rather than diminishing, are set to increase in the future (see 
Lawton 2009)  
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2006). At the same time, the emphasis upon skills supply fitted very well with New 
Labour’s conversion to a broadly neo- liberal growth model in which the commitment 
to a flexible, lightly regulated labour market took centre stage, an active industrial 
policy was thought (for the most part) to have no place, and direct forms of 
redistribution were heavily downplayed (see Lloyd and Payne 2002, Keep 2009).  
Focusing upon education and training allowed New Labour to sidestep controversial 
measures, such as using labour market regulation to block-off low cost competitive 
strategies and the reform of corporate governance arrangements necessary to embed a 
long-term investment ethic into the UK economy. On the social front, the strategy 
enabled New Labour to promise action on ‘fairness’ and social mobility without 
addressing material structures of inequality, both inside and outside the education 
system. As such, it did little to constrain the ability of the already privileged to use 
their wealth and cultural capital to secure places in ‘elite’ schools and universities for 
their offspring, thereby affording them an unfair positional advantage when 
competing for a finite supply of ‘good jobs’ (see Brown and Hesketh 2004, Keep and 
Mayhew 2010). 
Towards the end of New Labour’s period in office, however, the limits of a 
supply- led skills strategy were becoming increasingly clear.  The Leitch 2020 targets 
were, in the main, judged to be unattainable, and levels of ‘over-qualification’ and 
‘skills-mismatch’ were rising as demand for, and usage of, skills in the economy 
struggled to keep pace with the outputs of the education system (UKCES 2009b: 114-
122)2.  For most of its period in office, however, New Labour resisted arguments in 
favour of a more ‘demand-side’ approach to skills, even when those arguments came 
from within the policy community (see Cabinet Office 2001, Coffield 2002, Lloyd 
and Payne 2003). It was only as the administration was forced to grapple with the fall-
out from the 2007-08 banking crisis and the subsequent economic recession that New 
Labour’s stance began to shift. To begin with, there was an acknowledgement that the 
economy had become over-reliant upon financial services and the City of London, and 
that a more balanced approach to economic growth was needed, with the UK’s 
manufacturing base given greater prominence. Industrial policy, previously dismissed 
by New Labour as ‘picking winners/backing losers’, was partly rediscovered, with the 
                                                 
2 By 2006, nearly four in ten (39.6%) of the UK workforce were estimated to hold qualifications at a 
higher level than those needed to obtain their current job (Felstead et al 2007). Other research, using 
data from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), finds that over half of workers 
sampled feel their skills are not being fully utilised (Sutherland 2009). 
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business secretary, Lord Mandelson, referring to what he called the new ‘industrial 
activism’ (BERR 2009). While the government remained wedded to the Leitch 
targets, the issue of skills utilisation also began to be discussed within policy 
statements (DBIS 2009), albeit in rather hushed and muted tones (see Keep and 
Mayhew 2009). 
However, the most pressing challenge to a supply- led skills strategy came from 
the damage to the public finances dealt by bank ‘bail outs’ and the ‘quantitative 
easing’ of monetary policy as the Government sought to avoid a deep economic 
recession. By 2010, the public deficit had risen to over 10 percent of GDP. Even 
before New Labour was defeated in the May 2010 general election, it was evident that 
with the public finances under increasing strain, trying to spend/subsidise one’s way 
to victory in the ‘global skills race’ – even if one believed this to be possible – was no 
longer an option for any government. With the arrival of a new Con-Lib coalition 
government, led by David Cameron, the question was not would skills policy in 
England change, but whether, in doing so, it would be able to come to terms with the 
implications of the UKCES analysis and develop policy actions capable of addressing 
issues of skill demand and usage. 
The Coalition Government 
The Coalition Government inherited an economy from New Labour which had proven 
particularly vulnerable to the global financial crisis, an economy heavily reliant  upon 
the ‘City of London’ as a world financial centre, where economic growth had come to 
depend upon a booming housing market, over- leveraged banks and unsustainable 
levels of private debt. The economy’s trade deficit (which emerged under 
Conservative Governments in the 1980s) had grown to be the third largest in the 
world. Manufacturing industry contributed around 11 percent of GDP and employed 
less than one in ten of the workforce. These imbalances were compounded by 
significant regional disparities, notably between the London super-region and the rest 
of the UK (see Froud et al 2011 for further details). 
The Coalition took office vowing to tackle what it described as Labour’s ‘debt 
crisis’, restore order to the public finances and rebalance the economy, with the 
emphasis on saving rather than borrowing, reinvigorating export- led growth and 
reducing the nation’s reliance upon financial services (see HM Government 2010b). 
While all of the major political parties were united on the need for cuts in public 
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expenditure, the Coalition would cut faster and deeper, insisting that this was vital to 
the nation’s economic recovery. The Comprehensive Spending Review outlined cuts 
in public expenditure of £81 billion over four years, significantly higher than the £50 
billion planned by Labour (HM Treasury 2010). In terms of individual departmental 
budgets, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS) would face the 
biggest reduction of all, with a cut of 25 per cent. The budget for further education 
will be reduced by a quarter, from £4.3 billion to £3.2 billion by 2014-15.  
While the Coalition insisted that there could be no going back to the debt-
fuelled past, it was clear that there would not be any fundamental break with the neo-
liberal growth model established by Conservative governments in the 1980s and 
1990s and subsequently retained, in large measure, by New Labour after 1997 (see 
Lloyd and Payne 2002). In addition to fiscal rectitude, the new Government remains 
firmly committed to the UK’s flexible labour market, which it sees as an ‘intrinsic 
strength’, and favours further de-regulation of business, along with lower business 
taxes (HM Treasury/DBIS 2011). The Government has already taken steps in this 
direction, deciding for example not to extend the right to request time-off to train to 
businesses with fewer than 250 employees, and lowering corporation tax, which will 
fall to 23 percent by 2014. Its vision is of a ‘more productive… high tech, highly 
skilled economy’ in which ‘private sector growth must take the place of government 
deficits’, one that is ‘much more dynamic, less burdened by pointless barriers, and 
retooled for a high-tech future’, with a ‘more educated workforce that is the most 
flexible in Europe’, and where ‘prosperity must be shared across all parts of the UK’ 
(HM Treasury/DBIS 2011: 2-5). 
The Coalition’s skills strategy 
The Government has set out its skills strategy in a white paper, Skills for Sustainable 
Growth (DBIS 2010a), described by skills minister, John Hayes, as ‘one of the most 
important documents yet published by the coalition Government.’ The strategy is 
informed by three key principles: 
· Fairness – helping ‘those least able to help themselves’; 
· Responsibility – with employers and individuals taking ‘greater 
responsibility for ensuring their own skills needs are met’; and 
· Freedom – moving away from ‘stifling bureaucracy and meaningless 
targets’ and ‘trusting people to do their job’ (DBIS 2010a: 3). 
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Skills supply – still a case of great (and unrealistic) expectations 
Perhaps the first point to note is that in terms of the overall importance being afforded 
to skills supply, there is a strong line of continuity with the position adopted by the 
previous Labour government (Keep 2011). It is clear, for instance, that the Coalition 
continues to see skills as a key policy lever for delivering both economic performance 
and social mobility: 
Our ambition is that the UK should have a world-class skills base that 
provides a consistent source of competitive advantage... Skills are not 
just important for our global competitiveness, however. Skills have the 
potential to transform lives by transforming life chances and driving 
social mobility. (DBIS 2010a: 5) 
The measures outlined in the white paper are, as Vince Cable and John Hayes note in 
their foreword, designed to ‘fuel opportunity and power prosperity’ (DBIS 2010a, 
foreword, 3).  Indeed, Cable insists: 
If we are to achieve sustainable growth, nothing is more important than 
addressing the current failings in skills training… 
The white paper also goes on to affirm that: 
We still have too many people in this country whose lack of 
appropriate skills prevents them from finding sustainable work with 
prospects for progression. (DBIS 2010a: 33) 
The Chancellor, George Osborne, has also suggested that with the UK remaining 
behind France, Germany and the US in relation to workforce skills, skills is ‘probably 
the biggest problem facing our economy in the future’ (Osborne 2011).  
This is not quite the same rhetoric as that used by New Labour and Leitch. The 
Coalition’s statements are more qualified when it comes to the central importance of 
skills, with the Government also talking-up the need to unleash a spirit of enterprise 
and business dynamism (HM Treasury/DBIS 2011, Osborne 2011), but that said it is 
very close. It is clear for example that skills policy continues to shoulder a very heavy 
burden of expectation when it comes to both supporting international competitiveness 
and helping individuals to avoid unemployment and ‘bad jobs’ by providing them 
with the means to progress in the labour market. Here then it is very much a case of 
‘plus ça change…’ What has not changed are the aforementioned limitations of such a 
strategy given the way in which many UK firms choose to compete and the structure 
of the labour market. 
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Funding priorities 
Skills may still be key to the Government’s growth strategy but, as Vince Cable made 
clear bringing down the deficit means that it is ‘not in a position to throw money at 
the problem’. This means hard choices, prioritisation and a re-balancing between 
state, businesses and individuals when it comes to who pays for training.  
In terms of funding priorities, the Government is strongly committed to 
expanding apprenticeships, which now has the status of a flagship policy, and has 
stressed that it wants to see level 3 apprenticeships become the level ‘to which 
learners and employers aspire’, with ‘clearer progression pathways’ to level 4 
apprenticeships and higher education (DBIS 2010a). The white paper promised £250 
million to fund an additional 75,000 adult apprenticeship places on top of the previous 
Labour government’s plans. In the March 2011 budget, the Chancellor allocated an 
additional £180 million over four years to fund a further 50,000 apprenticeships, 
including 40,000 new apprenticeship places to help the young unemployed (HM 
Treasury/DBIS 2011). The sum of public money set aside to support these ambitions 
is, however, relatively small beer compared to the estimated £14 billion (at today’s 
prices) that the previous Conservative Government ploughed into the Youth Training 
Scheme (YTS) in the 1980s.   
Public funding will also be used to support basic skills acquisition and is to be 
targeted at the most disadvantaged groups. Full funding will be maintained for young 
adults, aged 19-24, taking a first full level 2 qualification (GCSE equivalent) or first 
level 3, and for all adults taking basic skills courses who left school without functional 
reading, writing and maths abilities. For learners aged 24 and over, there will be some 
co-funding at level 2, together with a new system of government-backed loans to 
support those wishing to take level 3 or higher qualifications. The Government also 
plans to invest £210 million in adult and community learning as part of a commitment 
to a wider and more liberal vision of lifelong learning. 
An end to central planning and targets 
The white paper also emphasises the Government’s determination to move beyond 
Leitch and to end the ‘culture of bureaucratic central planning and regulatory control’ 
that grew under New Labour, whereby the state sets ‘targets for the number and type 
of qualifications that ought to be delivered, and with learners and colleges following 
funding, rather than colleges responding to the needs of employers and the choices of 
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learners’ (DBIS 2010a: 5). The emphasis will henceforth be on demand-led funding, 
with the Skills Funding Agency (SFA) routing funding to providers in accordance 
with the purchasing choices of learners and employers, in what will, in effect, be a 
training market. The Government also promises greater freedom for providers to 
respond to local needs, along with more flexible and streamlined performance 
management mechanisms. Colleges judged to be ‘outstanding’ will be freed up from 
inspections, but those which are found to be ‘failing’ could find themselves being 
taken over and run by the private sector (DBIS 2010a: ch.4). The Leitch targets have 
been duly consigned to the policy dustbin, but ‘the Leitch ambition of developing a 
world-class skills base’ remains (DBIS 2010a: 13).   
In terms of skills supply, some of above policy moves are to be welcomed. The 
shift away from top-down targets and centralised planning, the re-valuing of 
apprenticeships, the desire to promote a broader liberal vision of adult lifelong 
learning, the commitment to funding basic skill needs and the expectation that 
employers will need to contribute more, are all positive, as is the recognition of the 
role that trade unions can play in supporting learning at work, and the continuing 
place afforded to UKCES which is expected ‘to become a true vehicle for economic 
growth and social partnership, with employers, trade unions and others coming 
together to give effective leadership on skills’ (DBIS 2010a: 13).  All the early 
indications are that there is a clear determination on the part of the new administration 
to move away from New Labour’s model of centralised control and take a more 
hands-off approach, with providers given more freedom over how they allocate and 
use their budget, even if this is likely to prove something of a culture shock for civil 
servants who have become rather used to dictating matters from the centre. At the 
same time, however, the strategy also raises a number of questions as well as some 
potential risks and pitfalls. 
Potential risks 
If there is one lesson to come out of the New Labour years, it is that making any kind 
of real progress on the Government’s idea of where the economy needed to be in 
terms of skills depended very heavily on the power of the public purse. With state 
funding/subsidy being radically scaled back, ‘developing a world-class skills base’ 
will now depend more than ever upon the willingness of individuals and employers to 
undertake and pay for more training. Having ruled out state- imposed training levies or 
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any significant extension of license-to-practice arrangements, except where they have 
the support of the majority of employers in a sector (DBIS 2010a: 23), the white paper 
places its faith in a combination of voluntarism, markets and private investment.  
A central assumption running throughout the white paper is that there is a 
latent or pent-up demand for education, training and skills, on the part of both 
employers and individuals, that is currently being blocked by the system of centralised 
planning/control and which can therefore be released through the operation of a more 
effective market for education and training. Thus, when it comes to employers, the 
white paper confidently asserts that they ‘are willing to invest – to invest far more 
than they do at present – in the skills of their workforces if they can be sure that the 
training they buy will be high quality and geared to their needs’ (DBIS 2010a: 12-13). 
This is a bold assertion, but unfortunately one which the white paper does not back up 
with any evidence.  
History might suggest a more sobering assessment. Those with long memories 
may cast their minds back 30 years to the previous Conservative Government’s New 
Training Initiative (MSC 1981), with its aim of creating a ‘permanent bridge between 
school and work’ and a Youth Training Scheme that was intended to rival the German 
‘dual apprenticeship’ system, and then to the numerous reforms and revamps to 
apprenticeships which followed as successive governments sought to develop a 
‘world-class’ work-based training route. Despite some successes with some 
employers in one or two sectors, the outcomes have, on the whole, been somewhat 
disappointing (see House of Lords 2007, Fuller and Unwin 2009, Wolf 2011).  
Overall, there has been an increase in apprenticeship numbers in general and 
some improvement in completion rates (albeit from a low start). However, as the Wolf 
Review makes abundantly clear, for school leavers the route remains marginal, with 
recent growth confined mainly to adult apprenticeships (25+) and those aged over 18. 
Apprenticeships for 16-18 year olds have actually declined as a proportion of the total 
in recent years, and account for somewhere between five to seven per cent of the age 
cohort (Wolf 2011: 166). Demand for places far outstrips supply, a situation which is 
unlikely to change even if the Government’s targets are met. 
There are also quality issues. The majority of UK apprenticeships are still to be 
found at level 2, which would not be recognised as an apprenticeship in countries such 
as Germany, Demark and Norway, where the system is underpinned by more 
extensive license to practice arrangements (at level 3). In 2009-10, less than one 
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quarter of 16-18 year olds starting an apprenticeship in the UK were on a level 3 
programme (Wolf 2011: 168). Furthermore, although precise data is hard to come by, 
the vast bulk of UK apprenticeships are managed not by employers but by private 
training providers or colleges, with most employers simply offering work placements 
(Fuller and Unwin 2004, 2009). Also, unlike in Europe, there is no component of 
wider ‘general education’ within the apprenticeship framework, other than the weak 
surrogate of ‘key skills’ (see Green 1998), which makes progression to higher 
education particularly difficult. In some sectors, such as retail, apprenticeships often 
involve little or no off-the-job training (Spielhoffer and Sims 2004). Not surprisingly, 
some commentators have begun to question how far the term ‘apprenticeship’ still has 
meaning in the UK (Fuller and Unwin 2004). 
Notwithstanding the huge sums of public money that have been invested in this 
project down the years, the vast bulk of employers have to date been unwilling to 
support the development of a vibrant, high-quality work-based route for new entrants 
to the workforce. In part, the problem may reflect a realisation on the part of 
employers that if they did not train themselves, the Government would step in and do 
this for them through an expanded further and higher education system. While 
reforms to university funding will shift the cost onto individuals, this issue remains 
and the white paper provides few clues as to why employers will now look to ‘co-
fund’ more level 3 apprenticeships when they can source the skills they need, cost-
free, in the form of level 4 degrees. From 2012, the government expects that for post-
19 apprenticeships, either the employer or the individual trainee will need to offer the 
training provider a sum equivalent to at least 50 per cent of the training costs as an up-
front payment before government support will be offered.  Individuals are expected to 
apply to the student loan company for an income-contingent loan to cover this 
contribution; employers are expected to reach into their own pockets. 
Previous attempts to get employers to co-fund training at level 3 through New 
Labour’s Train to Gain programme encountered real problems on this score. Such 
problems may be indicative of the relatively low demand for level 3 vocational 
qualifications in the UK compared to some of its major competitors (see Dickerson 
and Vignoles 2007). None of this bodes well for the present Government’s plans to 
expand apprenticeships and make level 3 ‘the level to which learners and employers 
aspire’. The fact that the Government is trying to do this in the midst of an extremely 
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fragile economic recovery, when employers are likely to be even less willing to take 
on apprentices, simply adds to the scale of the challenge. 
More generally, the state has found it extremely difficult in a ‘voluntarist’ 
training system to achieve influence over employers’ training decisions. One can go 
back to Coopers and Lybrand’s highly influential report, A Challenge to Complacency 
(1985), which emphasised the need to transform employer attitudes towards training 
and which set the foundations for future policy in this area and to the Conservative 
Government’s white paper, Employment for the 1990s (DE 1988), which created the 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), and its belief that an employer- led, locally-
focused training system would bring about a revolution in adult training provision. 
Despite endless exhortation, large rafts of government subsidy and endless attempts to 
convince employers that ‘training pays’, there has been very little progress on this 
front. Indeed, recent research by Mason and Bishop (2010) suggests that the incidence 
of employer-provided training across the workforce aged 16-64 has been falling since 
2000 and is now back to the level it was at in 1993. 
It is not just past experience, however, which casts doubt on whether 
employers – or indeed individuals for that matter – will respond in the way policy 
makers expect. As noted above, the white paper assumes that there is a problem of 
skills supply that can be rectified through a more efficient and responsive education 
and training market. This analysis is valid to the extent that the diagnosis of ‘the 
problem’ is the correct one. However, it is likely to fall short if the skills problem, as 
UKCES has argued, ‘lies largely on the demand side’.  
There is now a considerable body of research evidence which suggests that 
many organisations in the UK have, for perfectly rational reasons, developed 
strategies which do not require substantive levels of skill from the bulk of their 
workforce (see Keep et al 2006). One manifestation of this problem is that UK 
employers tend to require lower educational qualifications for labour market entry. As 
Green (2008: 17) notes: 
Unfortunately, Britain has long been caught in a low-qualification trap, 
which means that British employers tend to be less likely than in most 
other countries to require their recruits to be educated beyond the 
compulsory school leaving age. Among European countries, only in 
Spain, Portugal and Turkey is there a greater proportion of jobs 
requiring no education beyond compulsory school.  
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This situation, in turn, tends to weaken the incentives for many adults and young 
people to engage in education and training (Keep 2009b). It is interesting to note that 
in the consultation document which preceded the white paper, the Government 
acknowledged that: 
The overall demand for skills in the UK reflects a general tendency by 
many employers to compete in lower value and less intense markets 
requiring lower level skills. (DBIS 2010b: 23) 
However, this analysis does not appear in the white paper itself which offers no such 
over-arching diagnosis of the causes of the skills problem.  
Insofar as the UKCES analysis remains valid, however, it suggests that relying 
upon the motivation and willingness of employers to boost their investment in training 
may be far easier said than done. The question remains then: ‘how in a voluntarist 
training system and de-regulated labour market, and given existing levels and 
patterns of employer demand for skill, can employers be persuaded to substantively 
increase their investment in training this time round?’ As noted above, voluntarism, 
training markets and employer-leadership are, after all, nothing new; they were the 
watchwords of skills policy under Conservative Governments in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The white paper can be read as an attempt to give voluntarism yet another roll of the 
dice, only this time without the massive injections of public subsidy deployed by New 
Labour. Given past experience, this looks to be a pretty big gamble. The risk is that 
private investment falls and England finds itself trailing further behind other leading 
OECD nations in terms of it skills base. 
Skill utilisation 
When it comes to skill utilisation, the white paper acknowledges that, ‘we will not 
achieve sustainable growth unless people are able to make full use of their knowledge 
and skills in the workplace’ (DBIS 2010a: 44). The acknowledgement that skills 
utilisation matters is significant and welcome, particularly as a reminder of the limits 
of what is likely to be achieved through skills supply measures alone and the need to 
take account of the workplace context in which skills are developed and deployed.  At 
one level, however, this is simply a statement of truth; the real challenge being to 
design viable policy interventions which are capable of making a difference.  
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In addressing this issue, emphasis is placed upon the role of the ‘high 
performance workplace’ (HPW) and effective employee engagement. Thus the white 
paper states: 
…we want employers, employees, employee representatives and others 
to work together to create modern high-performing workplaces where 
skills are valued and fully used and where everyone is encouraged to 
give of their best for the good of the enterprise. (DBIS 2010a: 40) 
The view that HPW can support better skills utilisation is, as noted above, broadly in 
line with the position taken by UKCES in a series of recent publications on the topic 
(UKCES 2009b, 2010).  
In terms of the Government’s specific role, the white paper outlines a series of 
measures, which include: working alongside the TUC, ACAS, Business in the 
Community, the National Enterprise Academy and CIPD ‘to develop a new 
framework to support better leadership and management’; promoting Investors in 
People as ‘the improvement tool of choice for businesses wishing to grow through 
smarter acquisition and use of skills’; introducing a new pledge, whereby leading 
employers, Sector Skills Councils, trade unions and other representatives commit to 
working together to create HPWs; and establishing a Growth and Innovation Fund 
(with an annual budget of £50 million) designed to ‘support employers to be more 
ambitious about raising skills in their sectors and to promote workplace practices that 
will lead to better development and deployment of workplace knowledge and skills’ 
(DBIS 2010a: 8, 44-45).  
It is difficult at this stage to discern the precise shape of many of these 
initiatives. However, a number of observations might be made. First, the white paper 
provides little clarity in terms of what it means by a ‘high performance workplace’. 
Definitions of HPW – normally taken to refer to various combinations of managerial 
and work practices which when ‘bundled’ together are thought to improve 
organisational performance – are highly varied both in terms of the individual 
practices they are thought to comprise and the way in which those practices can 
themselves be defined and operationalised (see Lloyd and Payne 2006). If one takes 
‘team working’ for example, often said to be a core feature of HPW, in some cases 
teams may have extensive autonomy and problem solving capabilities. Equally, 
however, there are many examples of teams with limited discretion, where tasks are 
narrowly defined, and whose members are subject to extensive managerial 
supervision and control (see Barker 1993, Procter and Mueller 2000, Godard 2004). 
  17 
HPW can also be associated with ‘lean production’, which has often been found to be 
linked to downsizing, work intensification, deskilling and a loss of control and 
autonomy (see Kumar 2000).  
UKCES, while emphasising the potential of HPW to improve skills utilisation 
and create ‘good quality work’, acknowledges that ‘care needs to be taken to ensure 
that performance gains are not achieved to the detriment of employee well-being 
through increased workload, limited discretion and enhanced stress at work’ (UKCES 
2009a: 126, also Green 2010). There is, in other words, no simple equation between 
HPW and improved skill utilisation or better outcomes for employees, with more 
nuanced discussions stressing the importance of context and the manner in which 
practices are implemented and received in particular workplaces (see Hughes 2008, 
Green 2009, UKCES 2009, Wood and Bryson 2009, Edwards and Sengupta 2010). 
The second point is that if HPW is to be a/the means of delivering better skills 
utilisation, there are questions around how government might best support its 
adoption.  After three decades during which the benefits of employee engagement and 
strategic HRM have been widely promulgated among the business community, take-
up of HPW remains confined to a minority of UK organisations and did not increase 
significantly between 1998 and 2004 (see Kersley et al 2006, Edwards and Sengupta 
2010).  Some of the policy instruments identified to transform this situation (e.g. 
Investors in People) have been around for some time, while others, such as the 
voluntary pledge, rely upon exhortation and are likely to be a relatively weak lever for 
changing employer behaviour.  
Improving management and leadership capability is clearly important (see 
UKCES 2009a), although there are questions around how this can be best achieved 
and whether, on its own, it can produce the desired transformation that policy makers 
may expect. For what does not appear in the Government’s list of measures is any 
attempt to change the incentive structures in which firms and their managers operate 
and which shape behaviour. Ameliorating the pressures on firms to maximise short-
term shareholder returns (which can make long-term holistic organisational change 
difficult to achieve and sustain), or tackling a flexible, deregulated labour market (that 
allows firms to compete on this basis of low value added strategies with a relatively 
cheap and disposable workforce), remain firmly outside the boundaries of ‘legitimate’ 
policy debate. Instead, the problem is turned into a skills problem, but this time on the 
side of management rather than simply the workforce.  
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Given the aforementioned importance of context and implementation when it 
comes to getting HPW to work for the business and its employees, a strong case can 
be made for offering organisations expert advice and support that is tailored to their 
particular circumstances and needs. In the case of SMEs, this would seem to be 
especially important. All the ind ications are, however, that the Coalition does not 
envisage a role for locally targeted forms of business support aimed at helping 
organisations to implement changes in managerial and work practices, with Business 
Link regional services set to become a national website and call centre (see DBIS 
2010a: 43). How SMEs might be helped then to navigate their way through a quite 
complex process of designing and implementing such systems remains unclear.  
It is useful to consider, in this context, the Government’s view of innovation. 
As Keep (forthcoming) argues, the Coalition favours a ‘traditional model of 
innovation’, based on hard science, patents, publicly-funded R&D and efforts to 
improve technology and knowledge transfer from a ‘world-class’ university sector. 
Emphasis is being placed upon boosting the number of graduates in STEM subjects3 
and developing an ‘elite network of Technology and Innovation Centres’, modelled 
on Germany’s Fraunhofer institutes. These are useful policy developments, although 
as argued below there are questions about the level of investment. However, the idea 
that there might also be a role for innovation policy in supporting ‘social innovations’ 
inside firms and organisations, through targeted forms of advice and support aimed at 
helping them to develop appropriate forms of work organisation, is absent from this 
approach.  
This notion is more prominent in Europe, particularly in Scandinavia, the 
Netherlands and Germany, where workplace development/innovation programmes 
have been developed specifically for this purpose. In Finland, for instance, national 
workplace development programmes between 1996 and 2010 have funded research 
experts and consultants in projects specifically aimed at improving both productivity 
and the quality of working life (see Payne 2004, Alasoini 2006, Ramstad 2009a&b). 
Such programmes, which are funded by the state or social partners, have no real 
equivalent in the UK (see Payne and Keep 2003). It would also seem that England 
will not attempt to develop any specific skills utilisation projects, along similar lines 
                                                 
3 i.e. science, technology, engineering and mathematics. 
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to those currently being tried in Scotland involving colleges and universities (see 
Payne 2011).  
Local Economic Development 
Efforts to promote local economic development are a key part of any agenda which 
seeks to raise employer ambition in relation to skills. UKCES (2009b: 14) identifies 
local economic development as one of five core strategic priorities for the 
employment and skills system, highlighting the need to ‘support effective economic 
development in cities and local communities, built upon economic and labour market 
strengths and opportunities, and maximising the skills of the local working age 
population.’ How then is policy in this area taking shape under the Coalition 
Government?  
Here too the Coalition has moved rapidly, with the announcement that 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), established under Labour, are to be 
abolished, along with ‘regional strategies’, and replaced with new Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs), the details of which are set out in a new white paper, Local 
Growth: Realising Every Place’s Potential (HM Government 2010a). With the 
abolition of the RDAs (to be wound up by March 2012), LEPs will become the key 
vehicle for delivering sub-national economic development in England. What role will 
they play and how effective are they likely to be? 
A LE(a)P of faith? 
Announced initially in the Coalition’s programme for government, LEPs are ‘joint 
local authority-business bodies brought forward by local authorities themselves to 
promote economic development’ (HM Government  2010b: 10). With a board 
comprised of business and council representatives, and chaired by a prominent 
business leader, they will be expected to ‘provide the clear vision and strategic 
leadership to drive sustainable private sector- led growth and job creation in their 
area.’ Their role and functions will be ‘diverse’, spanning transport, planning, 
strategic housing delivery, employment and the transition to a low carbon economy 
‘as part of an integrated approach to growth and infrastructure delivery’ (HM 
Government 2010a: 13).  The white paper describes these moves as part of the 
Coalition’s commitment to localism and building the ‘Big Society’ by devolving ‘real 
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power to communities, giving them a greater say in shaping the shape and future of 
their economies’ (HM Government 2010a: 8). 
Following a letter on 28 June 2010 inviting local councils and business leaders 
to submit proposals (by 6 September 2010), the white paper gave the green light to 24 
LEPs selected from 62 original bids. A further seven, including one covering the 
whole of London, have since been announced, bringing the total number of LEPs so 
far in England to 31. There are, however, some serious question marks about whether, 
in their current form, LEPs will provide a powerful vehicle for locally-driven 
economic development.  
Policy rationale behind the LEPs 
The official policy rationale behind the creation of LEPs is three fold. First, LEPs will 
be in a better position to reflect ‘real functional economic areas’ than the RDAs which 
were based on ‘administrative regions’. Second, LEPs will be more efficient, given 
that ‘previous arrangements also involved significant complexity and duplication of 
responsibilities, which led to increased costs to the public purse’ (HM Government 
2010a: 13). Third, by devolving decisions and power to local actors, they will be more 
‘directly accountable to local people and local businesses’ than the RDAs which were 
unelected government ‘quangos’ (HM Government 2010a: 12). Each of these claims 
is open to question.  
As Johnson and Schmuecker (2010: 3) note, the idea of developing governance 
arrangements which allow local actors to shape decisions that are based on real 
‘functional economic areas’ is, of course, ‘entirely va lid’. However, as they also 
remind us, such areas are ‘amorphous and notoriously difficult to define… [and] 
historically evolve more quickly than public policy can keep pace with.’ Whether one 
looks at travel to work patterns, supply chains, housing, retail markets or particular 
industries and sectors, the relationship between places can be extremely complex, 
such that identifying a functional economic space is anything but straightforward.  
Given the difficulties involved and the importance of getting such decisions 
right, it might seem rather surprising then that the Government allowed a mere 69 
days for local authorities and business leaders to get their act together and submit 
bids. And it comes as no great shock, therefore, that many of the subsequent bids 
appeared to lack political backing from the areas they claimed to cover, sometimes 
overlapped with one another, were generally ‘thin’ in terms of the extent of business 
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engagement and involvement, and lacked a strong evidence base (SQW 2010). In the 
end, less than half were judged to have met the necessary criteria to be sanctioned by 
Government. At the same time, the involvement of local councils in LEPs means 
inevitably that they too will be tied to artificial administrative boundaries, a point 
which has already attracted some criticism from within the business community.  
When it comes to efficiency and value for money, the Coalition Government 
has made no secret that it considers the RDAs a wasteful extravagance and the 
epitome of all that was wrong with New Labour’s ‘quango state’, the communities 
and local government secretary, Eric Pickles, describing them as ‘bloated regional 
quangos’ (The Guardian 2010). The RDAs’ position was certainly not helped by some 
high profile media examples of largesse on the part of certain chief executives – for 
example, the former chairman of SEEDA running up a £50k chauffeur and taxi bill in 
the space of 12 months (see Sunday Times 2007). Nor, for that matter, was it helped 
by the lack of any really robust evaluation of their work over the past 11 years (see 
Keep et al 2006), although supporters can point to a recent report from the National 
Audit Office (2010), which found that for every £1 spent by RDAs between £4 and 
£15 was produced in regional economies (Bentley et al 2010:551). 
Some question whether LEPs will be any more efficient than the RDAs 
(Bentley et al 2010, WMLGA 2010). In place of the eight RDAs and the London 
Development Agency, there will now be a much larger number of smaller and more 
fragmented bodies (the final number of LEPs at this stage remains unclear). The 
removal of the regional tier of governance presumes that there will need to be a high 
level of cross-LEP coordination, for example in terms of sharing research facilities. 
By the same token, it also raises the possibility that some services and functions could 
be duplicated, ‘with unhelpful, as opposed to healthy, competition’, and a 
corresponding loss of efficiency (WMLGA 2010: 6). 
On paper, the involvement of local councils and businesses ought to provide 
for decisions that are more locally-driven and in tune with the needs of local 
communities.  It is not clear at this stage, however, through what mechanisms and 
procedures LEPs will be rendered accountable to local communities and their citizens, 
a factor of some significance given that the views of local businesses on issues such as 
strategic planning applications may not necessarily accord with those of local 
residents (see WMLGA 2010).  The involvement of senior local authority officers is 
central to ensuring that such structures pass the democratic accountability test. As a 
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discussion paper from the West Midlands Local Government Association (WMLGA 
2010) makes clear, where LEPs span several local authority areas, meetings may 
become quite large, making it harder to reach consensus over difficult decisions, 
especially in cases where councils have statutory responsibilities such as housing, 
transport etc. Where there is a need for ‘cross-LEP working’, the involvement of 
representatives from other LEPs and the need to secure the agreement of individual 
local authority cabinets has the potential to make the process both time consuming 
and somewhat unwieldy.  
If such decision-making structures do prove to be slow and bureaucratic, this 
may test the  patience of business representatives. Indeed, the soundings from the 
business community who worry that LEPs will become, in the words of the former 
head of the CBI, Richard Lambert, ‘council-dominated talking shops’ (Financial 
Times 2010), do not augur well. If these fears turn out to be well founded, winning 
and retaining the commitment, enthusiasm and membership of local business people 
will be extremely challenging. Others have argued that policy is politically-driven and 
is more about abolishing the RDAs than anything else, reflecting a ‘long-standing 
opposition by the Conservative Party to regionalism’ that can be traced back to the 
dismantling of regional policy under the Thatcher government (Bentley et al 2010: 
549). Whatever the motivation, however, there are real concerns about whether LEPs 
will have sufficient resources and powers to act as a robust vehicle for local economic 
development (see SQW 2010, WMLGA 2010, Bentley et al 2010).  
Funding 
Unlike the RDAs, LEPs will receive no direct funding from central government. 
Instead, they will have to bid for funds from a new Regional Growth Fund (RGF) 
which will make available £1.4 billion spread over three years. This represents a 
significant cut in funding for sub-national economic development in England, when 
compared with the RDAs’ annual budget of 2.3 billion. In submitting bids to the RGF, 
LEPs will also face stiff competition from other businesses and private-public 
partnerships, with the white paper warning that LEPs cannot expect any ‘preferential 
treatment’. The white paper also states that LEPs will be ‘expected to fund their own 
day-to-day running costs and will also want to consider how they can obtain the best 
value for public money by leveraging in private sector investment’ (HM Government 
2010a: 15). 
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How far local businesses will be prepared to contribute to the administrative 
costs of running a LEP, or pay for the services they offer, remains to be seen. Some  
LEPs, like Greater Manchester, with long-established histories of joint-working and 
resource generation, may well fare better than others (see SQW 2010). Given the 
current economic downturn, not to mention the difficulties that sectors skills councils 
have experienced when it comes to getting employer contributions (see Payne 2008), 
it could well end up being pretty tough going for many. 
Discretionary powers 
Besides funding constraints, there are concerns that LEPs will not have the 
discretionary powers at their disposal needed to promote local economic development. 
The Government signa lled very early on that ‘core RDA functions’, such as inward 
investment, innovation, sector leadership, business support and access to finance, 
would be ‘led-nationally’, in what some commentators saw as a process of ‘creeping 
centralisation’ (Financial Times 2010).  At the same time, however, the Government 
continued to hold out the promise that LEPs might be able to share certain functions 
in these areas, Vince Cable referring initially to the possibility of ‘devolved local 
management in some cases’. 
There is no doubt that many LEPs have expressed their desire to perform a 
continuing role in relation to these former RDA functions (see SWQ 2010, WMLGA 
2010). The white paper on Local Growth states that ‘the new delivery framework for 
functions led at national level will be flexible and take account of the evolving 
capabilities and priorities of different local enterprise partnerships’, adding that 
‘national leadership does not necessarily imply a monopoly of power and 
responsibility, and there will be scope to share and pool power and responsibility 
between national and local levels’ (HM Government 2010a: 17). So exactly how is 
responsibility and power to be shared in this new evolving relationship between the 
centre and the local? 
In terms of business support functions, as noted above, Business Link regional 
services are to be replaced with a national website and call centre. The Government 
will fund the creation of new ‘Growth Hubs’ designed to ‘provide access to specialist 
strategic advice, coaching and mentoring to firms with high growth potential’ (HM 
Government 2010a: 42). The role of LEPs will be to offer ‘locally focused 
information and advice’, by helping to understand the local skill set, identifying local 
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support networks and providing advice on how best to deliver growth (HM 
Government 2010a: 17). They will, we are told, have a ‘very important role in 
supporting enterprise and businesses in their areas’ by helping to promote ‘a more 
entrepreneurial culture’, supporting business start-ups, fostering business networks 
and mentoring, and developing the infrastructure for successful business communities 
(HM Government 2010a: 42). 
Support for business innovation will be led nationally by the BIS-sponsored 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB). As previously noted, the Government is setting 
aside £200 million to create a new ‘elite network’ of Technology and Innovation 
Centres (TICs) whose role will be to support the take up and commercialisation of 
new technological innovations and research. The first of these centres in high value 
manufacturing has now opened, which will coordinate the activities of seven existing 
research centres (two in Rotherham, two in Coventry, and one each in Glasgow, 
Durham/Redcar and Bristol). The Plan for Growth makes no reference to the role of 
LEPs in relation to TICs, with some commentators already questioning how local 
areas which are without such centres will be able to support their manufacturing 
ambitions (Marlow 2011). Inward investment will also be coordinated nationally by 
UK Trade and Investment, with LEPs again promised a supportive role in providing 
local information and support. How inward investment around TICs will be 
coordinated and delivered to reflect local needs is not vouchsafed (Marlow 2011). 
The role of LEPs also remains limited in relation to skills. As noted above, all 
adult skills funding will now be routed through the Skills Funding Agency (SFA) to 
colleges and other providers according to what individual learners and employers 
want and are prepared to pay for. The previous government’s plans to give local 
authorities a lead role in funding and commissioning 14-19 provision, through sub-
regional groupings and linking this to wider regional strategies, have also been 
scrapped. Sixteen to 18 funding for FE colleges and other independent providers will 
now be routed through the SFA thereby providing a single point of contact. These 
moves will undoubtedly be welcomed by many colleges who tended to regard 
Labour’s proposed arrangements, with good cause, as overly complex and 
bureaucratic (for a discussion, see Payne 2010).  
However, LEPs will still be required ‘to develop effective working 
relationships with the further and higher education sector and engage directly with 
their networks of colleges and training organisations in order to agree how to 
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generate the demand for agreed strategic priorities locally…’ (HM Government  
2010a: 49, emphasis added). It is difficult to see how LEPs can be effective in this 
role, given that they will have no formal powers over providers. With funding being 
driven by learner demand (based on the demand in the previous year) and what 
employers are willing to pay for to meet their immediate needs, it is not clear how 
LEPs will be in a position to strategically shape local skills provision in accordance 
with the current, emerging and future economic development needs of their areas. As 
a paper from the WMLGA has noted: 
With many FE institutions having wide catchment areas and markets, 
the ability to ground any particular institution within a LEP to make it 
identify with a local economic context may prove difficult. By the 
same token, concerns have been expressed in some quarters of business 
and FE that the introduction of LEPs and the new funding regime will 
discourage joined-up working by colleges across boundaries and make 
it harder to provide skills where there is a wider need but no ready 
market able to pay for them. This may impact on objectives to 
frontload skills for small but emerging sectors, providing a joined up 
offer for inward investment and pump priming and future, aspirational 
economic sectors. (WMLGA 2010: 15) 
In other words, ensuring that skills provision is aligned with local economic 
development needs still requires some form of sophisticated long-term strategic 
planning. How and through what mechanisms this will happen in a competitive 
‘market- led’ skills system remains unclear. 
One thing does seem fairly certain.  It is the Government who decides how 
responsibility and power are to be shared and distributed in this new national- local 
relationship, and the white paper can be read as an attempt to put a fairly thin gloss of 
localism on what remains essentially a process of centralisation (see Bentley et al 
2010).  The Plan for Growth, published as part of the March 2011 budget, argues that 
LEPs will have ‘a vital role in supporting local authorities plan for key sub national 
infrastructure’, and emphasises their contribution to the development of new 
Enterprise Zones, similar to those developed by previous Conservative governments 
in the 1980s (HM Treasury/DBIS 2011: 48). However, this does little to disguise the 
limited resources that LEPs will have at their disposal and their marginalisation in 
terms of strategic economic development functions. 
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Back to industrial policy (not) 
Finally, it should be noted that although core RDA functions are being re-centralised, 
this does not mean that the Government is willing to contemplate a national industrial 
policy approach. Vince Cable made clear very early on that, ‘My general approach 
going forwards will be supporting enterprise, but rarely targeting individual 
enterprises for support’,  and that in terms of technology, innovation, skills and 
infrastructure, ‘when these policies are effective they almost always target 
capabilities, not companies’ (Cable 2010b). There will then be no ‘picking winners’ 
or supporting ‘national champions’. Labour’s £1 billion Strategic Investment Fund, 
launched in 2009 to provide selective investment in key areas such industrial bio-tech 
and low carbon vehicles, was dismissed by Cable in opposition as a ‘really dreadful 
Old Labour idea’ and a ‘massive waste of money’ (cited in Horton 2010), and, after 
two years, has been duly dispensed with. The Government has also cancelled certain 
loans, notably to Sheffield Forgemasters, which was attempting to break into the 
market to supply heavy components to nuclear power plants.  
 Industrial policy is controversial and has never had much appeal to 
governments of a neo- liberal, free-market persuasion. Dolling out government money 
to ‘lame ducks’ is certainly not a good idea. But this is not the same as nurturing and 
supporting new leading edge sectors and helping firms to develop the ‘critical mass’ 
and particular specialisms needed to break into high value global markets. As Brown 
et al (2010, 2011) note, with low cost emerging economies, such as China and India, 
rapidly improving their indigenous skills base, they increasingly provide a platform 
for both the low and high value added activities of leading multi-national companies 
and are increasingly competing for a share of high-end work. This means that, more 
than ever before, developed countries need to find ways of ensuring that they can stay 
ahead of the game when it comes to innovation and gaining a ‘smart’ competitive 
edge. Boosting the supply of high skills is not enough; policies are also needed to 
build the economy’s ‘capacity for high-skill utilisation’ (Brown et al 2010: 54, see 
also Buchanan et al 2009, 2010). This means some form of modern industrial policy 
that can help to restructure the economy and raise employer ambition. In other 
countries, such as France, Japan and Germany, this role is broadly accepted. But in 
the UK, it rubs up against neo- liberal sentiment and a certain squeamishness when it 
comes to the role of the state in supporting industry. As Horton (2010) notes, in the 
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end the problem with not picking any winners is that one can simply end up with very 
few winners.  
As noted above, the Coalition Government is seeking to create new institutions 
which aim to target areas such as innovation. While these developments are to be 
welcomed, there are serious question marks over whether this is enough. For example, 
£200 million is not a lot of money to create an ‘elite network of Technology and 
Innovation Centres’, especially if the intention is to emulate Germany’s 59 Fraunhofer 
institutes (which have a budget of 1.6 billion euros, a large proportion of which comes 
from research contracts with industry).  
Final Thoughts 
As under the previous Labour government, the Coalition continues to argue that skills 
are central to both economic performance and social inclusion/mobility. Of course, 
there is no question that skills, acting in combination with other elements, do have a 
very important role to play. The issue is whether the overall ‘policy mix’ is 
sufficiently balanced and robust to tackle a UK ‘skills problem’, which research 
suggests encompasses not just problems of skills supply but also demand and usage.   
Given the state of the public finances and with the Government committed to a 
radical reduction in the deficit, skills policy is now being developed for an age of 
austerity. Out go targets/ planning, top-down micro-management of the skills system, 
and large doses of public subsidy, to be replaced with markets, private investment and 
small(er) government. The $64,000 dollar question is whether in a voluntarist training 
system and deregulated labour market, and given current patterns of employer 
demand for, and usage of, skill, employers and individuals will increase their 
investment in education and training sufficient to deliver progress towards the 
Government’s ambition of creating a ‘world-class skills base’. The Government 
believes that with greater choice over what training they can buy, they will; history, 
together with recent research, might question such optimism. 
When it comes to addressing issues of skills demand and utilisation, the 
Coalition places its faith in some fairly modest and familiar measures. These include 
building support for ‘high performance workplaces’ (whatever these turn out to be) 
mainly through exhortation and voluntary pledges, supporting better management and 
leadership, and providing financial support via a small Growth and Innovation Fund. 
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It remains to be seen how much progress can be made on the back of these initiatives, 
but insofar as it relies upon persuading employers of the benefits of HPW, it is 
difficult to see why an approach, which has been flogged pretty much to death over 
the past 30 years, should meet with any greater success this time round. With business 
support, through Business Links, also set to become a national call centre and website, 
there are searching questions about how firms, particularly SMEs, can be given the 
kind of targeted help and expert advice they need to implement more skill- intensive 
production strategies. 
In terms of sub-national economic development, a great deal is riding on the 
success of the LEPs and the RGF. Without central funding and with limited powers, 
concerns have already been voiced, both among the academic and business 
communities, about how effective the LEP project will prove. It is possible, of course, 
that some, like the Greater Manchester LEP for example, which benefit from 
established histories of joint working and income generation, may make some 
progress. Others, however, look as if they may well struggle. Indeed, some 
commentators close to local government have already expressed fears that they could 
turn out to be something of a ‘poisoned chalice’ and that ‘[h]anding respons ibility for 
economic development to councils and local businesses during such tough times runs 
the danger of setting councils up to fail’ (WMLGA 2010: 24).  
When it comes to the role of central government in helping to raise employer 
ambition, de-regulation rather than re-regulation is the name of the game. There will 
be no attempt to block-off low value added competitive strategies which rely upon 
low wage costs and numerical labour flexibility, and which make only very limited 
skill demands on the bulk of their workforces. While there will be state support to 
boost technology and knowledge transfer to industry, albeit on fairly limited scale, the 
idea of an active industrial policy remains, for this Government, something of an 
anathema. In this context, focusing upon education and training allows English policy 
makers to promise action on both economic and social problems, but without 
challenging the fundamentals of the UK’s neo- liberal growth model. This was 
certainly the case under New Labour, and it remains so for a centre-right Coalition 
which is simply a ‘purer’ and ‘more pristine’ advocate of business deregulation and 
labour market flexibility (see Hay 2011).  
What all of this suggests is that the political and ideological space for 
developing the kind of integrative policy mix that may be needed to address the UK’s 
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long-standing ‘skills problem’ is likely to be very tightly constrained in England 
under the Coalition. Outside England, notably in Scotland, skills policy is moving in a 
different direction and there is a real determination on the part of policy makers to 
address problems of skills demand and utilisation. Given that the UK government 
retains control over labour market policy and employment relations there are, 
inevitably, certain limits to the room for policy manoeuvre.  However, the 
commitment to address skills utilisation has been sustained in Scotland over the past 
four years (not an inconsiderable length of time when one considers the rate at which 
skills policy in England has chopped and changed in recent times).  Current 
initiatives, such as the Scottish Funding Council’s skills utilisation projects, are 
interesting and are beginning to make some progress, albeit on a limited scale (see 
Payne 2011). The re-election of a Scottish National Party administration in the May 
2011 elections would suggest that such experimentation will continue at least for the 
foreseeable future. It seems fairly clear then that skills policy trajectories will continue 
to diverge between England and Scotland. The more Scotland can make progress on 
this agenda, the more this will present a challenge to the approach being pursued 
south of the border. 
Such progress will certainly not be easy, especially in the current period of 
austerity. More than ever, however, it is important that progress is made. For without 
it, the prospects for tackling many of the fundamental social and economic challenges 
confronting the UK – problems rooted in the way in which many firms compete and 
the structure of our labour market – would seem remote. 
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